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Abstract 
 
Taking into account the relevant literature, it is argued in this review that important 
advances can be made in the application of decision sciences to economics if greater 
attention is given to the presence of diversity in the types of economic decision-
making and behaviour. This is of particular significance for understanding market 
dynamics. This requires both rational and irrational types of decision-making to be 
taken into account. A limitation of neoclassical and much mainstream economic 
theory in its lack of consideration of this diversity and its economic consequences. 
Different types of rational and irrational choices are specified in this article. Even 
rational decision-making and behaviour can be quite diverse. Empirical evidence is 
provided of diversity in economic decision processes and the consequences of this 
diversity is noted. Most attention is paid to the influence on the dynamics and 
stability of market systems of the diversity of the beliefs and behaviour of market 
participants. It is shown how a preponderance of sticky decision-making or 
restrained reactions in markets can improve the dynamics of their adjustment when 
market equilibrium alters or a market is disturbed but its equilibrium remains 
unchanged. It is observed that these reactions can be socially beneficial. Several 
different restrained forms of decision-making and behaviour are identified which 
make for stickiness in market behaviour and decision-processes. 
 
Keywords: Economic attentiveness, economic diversity, market dynamics, market 
stability, rationality, sticky decisions. 
JEL: D9, E7. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, it is argued that advances in the theory and application of decision 
science (and in its relevance to economics) will be facilitated if greater attention is 
paid than currently to the existence of different types of rational decisions and the 
diversity of behaviour. The diversity of behaviour should encompass not only 
variations in rational decision-making but also those which might be regarded as 
irrational.  
 
A general scientific theory of behaviour should take into account all types of 
behaviour. This requires consideration to be given to the distribution of different 
types of decision-making and behaviour in populations, the persistence of these 
distributions and identification of the factors that cause these distributions to alter 
as well as the extent to which they change. Regular and relevant laws about market 
decision-making and its consequences can be established once this approach is 
adopted. Theories which assume uniformity in decision-making and behaviour 
become special cases, and scientific progress is promoted. 
 
Neoclassical models of economic decision-making and behaviour represent special 
cases because (among other things) they do not allow for the presence of diversity 
in decision-making and in behaviour. Alfred Marshall (1920) based his theory of 
economic supply on decision-making by representative firms and John Hicks (1956, 
p. 55) assumed that, in order to develop his microeconomic theory, it was adequate 
to model it on the basis of the type of decisions an average consumer is supposed 
to make. Although both these economists were aware of the existence of diversity 
in economic decision-making and behaviour, they did not incorporate these aspects 
into their theories.  
 
Today also, all microeconomic texts fail to pay much attention to diversity in 
economic behaviour. While this can be useful if only a general guide is needed 
about how most markets work, it is inadequate for understanding the operation of 
all markets. Furthermore, the type of rational decision-making which is the usual 
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basis of neoclassical economics is not necessarily rational nor representative of 
reality, as will be made clear in this article and has been noted by others.  
 
The preoccupation persists of many economists with the supposed prevalence of 
rational economic behaviour and its uniformity, as well as its desirability. For 
example, there is a continuing preoccupation with rational expectation models. This 
is either because it is believed that they are a relevant description of economic 
reality (Muth, 1961) or because actions based on rational expectations represent 
desirable behaviour. Both empirical evidence and advances in decision theory (such 
as the development of theories of bounded rationality, see Simon, 1957; Tisdell, 
1968, Ch. 2) cast doubt on the wisdom of assuming that economic agents display a 
high degree of rationality in their decision-making and in their behaviour (see also 
Tisdell, 1971). Moreover, the extent to which uniformity occurs in decision-making 
and behaviour is limited.  
 
In order to elaborate on the above contentions, the following matters will be 
considered in turn: 
• Why are most economists preoccupied with rational decision-making and 
behaviour? 
• A classification of different types of decision-making and behaviour in 
relation to the concept of rationality will be proposed. 
• Basic sources of diversity in economic decision-making and behaviour will 
be identified. 
• Evidence will be presented about the occurrence and the diverse nature of 
decision-making and behaviour. 
• Economic implications of diversity in types of decision-making and 
behaviour will be highlighted. 
2. Why are Most Economists Preoccupied with Rational 
Decision-Making and Behaviour? 
There are several possible reasons why most economists focus their analyses on 
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rational decision-making and behaviour.  
 
These include the following: 
• They believe that individuals (and economic agents) do act rationally, or the 
overwhelming majority do. 
• They consider it to be important to discover ways to improve the rationality 
of economic decision-making and behaviour. The focus, in this case, is on 
discovering methods which result in decisions and behaviour being more 
rational. 
• They may also be of the opinion that rational economic decision-making 
and behaviour is “desirable”. 
•  
The first two reasons are positivist in nature whereas the last reason is a normative 
one. 
 
Much of economic theory and its application is based on the view that individuals 
do act rationally (for example, neoclassical economic theory and theorems of 
rational economic expectations). In addition, many economists believe rational 
behaviour to be desirable. Economists have given far less attention to the methods 
for improving the rationality of decisions and behaviour but these have not been 
entirely neglected by them (Tisdell, 1996, Ch. 3). 
 
Unfortunately, the meaning of the concept of rationality in decision-making and 
behaviour has not been given much attention by economists. Once the nature of 
rationality as a concept is considered, it becomes clear that the range of decisions 
and behaviour that can be classified as rational is very diverse. This diversity of 
behaviour and types of decision-making is even greater when the presence of 
irrational behaviour is accounted for. The scope for this diversity can be appreciated 
by considering the following classification of types of decision-making and 
behaviour in relation to the concept(s) of rationality. 
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3. Classification of Types of Decision-Making in Relation to the 
Concept(s) of Rationality and Implications for Diversity  
Two different meanings in English of the word ‘rational’ exist. One implies the 
presence of (logical) reasoning. The other is a wider concept. It is associated with 
behaviour or decision-making that can be regarded as reasonable. It should be noted 
that some behaviour that involve logical reasoning may be unreasonable. 
Furthermore, some behaviour that involve no reasoning can be reasonable or 
rational, given the second meaning of rational. These possibilities are noted in 
Tisdell (1996, Ch. 2). The Venn diagrams help to clarify these concepts (Fig. 1). 
 
The set D in Fig 1 includes instinctive behaviour which are reasonable (or effective 
for a specific purpose) if circumstances arise when there is no time for reasoning. 
The rational amount of reasoning depends on the urgency with which action is 
required. Possibly, some habitual behaviour could also be included in set D. 
 
The status of another set of decision-making processes also needs consideration. 
These involve the rationality of predetermining actions to be taken should particular 
events occur in the future. The degree of preparedness for future decisions or actions 
may be rational or irrational, and the exact action to be taken in the event of a 
particular occurrence may be completely determined or may only partially be 
determined. Completely determined responses basically involve no reasoning, once 
a specified event occurs or is observed. Individuals are liable to differ in the extent 
to which they prepare in advance for making future decisions. Moreover, the extent 
to which it is rational for them to do so is also likely to vary. 
 
A major issue in considering the rationality of decision-making and behaviour is 
how to take account of the adequacy of the perceptions of individuals of reality. 
Many decisions have to be made on the basis of limited knowledge of reality. 
Furthermore, given the cost of information gathering and its organization, it is 
usually only rational to attain a limited knowledge of reality. Because individuals 
often acquire different sets of information about reality, this is an added source of 
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diversity in their decisions and behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  
 
A classification of rational decision-making and behaviour.  
The size of the sets is not indicative of frequencies. 
 
  
Absence of reasoning 
Set of Reasoned Decisions Set of Reasonable Behaviour 
Reasonable Unreasonable 
Logically reasoned 
A B 
C D 
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Even given the same set of evidence, individuals can reasonably come to different 
conclusions about its implications. Usually, evidence about reality is incomplete. 
Consequently, the implications of evidence about reality are often uncertain. This 
can be an additional source of differences in behaviour. 
 
To some extent, theories of decision-making based on subjective probability (De 
Finetti, 1937; Savage, 1954) and on logical probability (Carnap, 1950; Keynes, 
1921) allow for this diversity. These probability distributions can be different for 
different individuals even if they are provided with the same evidence. For example, 
given the same set of evidence, it can be rational for two different individuals to 
come to dissimilar conclusions about its probable implication for reality. For 
instance, their probability distributions in relation to this evidence can differ. For 
example, in determining logical probabilities, individuals may place different 
weights on the reliability of the evidence presented to them or obtained. 
 
The complexity of the real world conditions limits the application of some statistical 
models and experiments to the actual processes of decision-making. Statistical 
models based on relative frequencies can, for instance, be inapplicable. This is also 
true of structured experiments that basically rely on responses to the relative 
frequency of the occurrence of particular events or changes in their frequencies. 
4. Evidence About Diversity in Decision-Making 
Tisdell and Wilson (2012) found, as a result of surveying visitors to a tourist 
attraction in northern Queensland (Jourama Falls), that they varied considerably in 
how well they were informed before visiting such attractions, and the amount of 
time they spend on informing themselves differs a lot (Tisdell and Wilson, 2012, 
Ch. 7). Respondents also reported substantial differences about when they gathered 
information about tourist attractions in a holiday region. Nearly 31 per cent of 
respondents said that they gathered most of their information about tourist 
attractions in a holiday region before arriving in the region, just over 13 per cent 
reported that this was done once they arrived in a holiday region, and 52.5 per cent 
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responded that they collected about equal amounts of information before and after 
coming to a holiday area (Tisdell and Wilson, 2012, Ch. 7).  
 
A very small proportion of respondents gave no answer or an incorrect reply to this 
query. These results indicate that considerable diversity can occur in the way in 
which tourists make decisions to visit tourist attractions. These differences are 
likely to be important for devising strategies to promote and advertise tourist 
attractions. 
 
A survey of visitors to Mareeba Wetland and Savannah Reserve in northern 
Queensland revealed substantial diversity in their knowledge about this attraction 
prior to their visit and the considerable lack of their prior knowledge about it. Just 
over 77 per cent of those interviewed reported that their prior knowledge of it was 
non-existent or poor whereas nearly 33 per cent said that their prior knowledge of 
it was good to excellent (Tisdell and Wilson, 2012, Section 8.4). Nearly 86 per cent 
of visitors surveyed were first-time visitors, and they were the ones who were 
mostly poorly informed prior to their visit or who said they had no knowledge about 
the attraction before visiting it.  
 
As a result of an experiment-based study, Henckel et al. (2018) produced strong 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
frequency with which beliefs are updated and in the amount by which beliefs are 
varied as the signals received by individuals are altered. Furthermore, they found 
that most participants in their experiment did not rationally adjust their beliefs 
(expectations) when rational adjustment is determined by the application of Bayes 
law. Only 5 per cent of their respondents acted in accordance with Bayes law. 
 
Moreover, they discussed that when their subjects did change their expectations 
(beliefs), they did so by only 35 per cent of the amount required by Bayesian 
updating. They state that the amount of this adjustment falls “well short of what full 
rationality requires”. They are of the opinion that beliefs and decisions tend to be 
‘sticky’. Stickiness can have two dimensions, namely infrequent adjustment of 
9 
 
beliefs as events alter, and damped (moderated) changes in beliefs.  
 
The extent to which the experimental results and analysis of Henckel et al. (2018) 
can be generalized is unclear. However, both these dimensions of decision-making 
are important and worthy of further investigation. As discussed below, both 
diversity in behaviour and in their stickiness can be important for the stability of 
some types of markets. 
5. Economic Implications of the Distribution of Different Types 
of Decision-Making and Behaviour and Restrained Reactions 
Tisdell (1968, 2013) and others have identified several economic implications of 
variation in the distribution of different types of economic decisions and behaviour 
of economic agents, but more needs to be done. It was noted in the previous section 
that differences in the decision-making processes of tourists are important factors 
to take into account when advertising and promoting tourist attractions. To give 
another example, the distribution of the willingness of potential buyers to purchase 
new products affects the dynamics of their market penetration and the flow of 
profits from product innovations.  
 
The nature of these flows can make the difference between innovative success and 
failure and is consequential for business viability (Tisdell, 2013, Ch. 3). Several 
other examples could be cited. In this section, I want to focus on how restrained 
reactions of market participants can promote stability and convergence to market 
equilibrium when market conditions change. 
 
The degree of restraint displayed by market participants in adjusting to altered 
market conditions often differs; some are more restrained in their reactions than 
others. The dynamics of market adjustment depends upon the overall restraint 
exhibited by buyers and sellers in responding to altered market conditions. In 
several cases, market responses which are restrained can help a market to converge 
towards a new market equilibrium or facilitate its return to an existing one when a 
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temporary shock causes a deviation from equilibrium. The latter possibility is 
illustrated by Tisdell (2013, Sections 9.3 and 9.4) and the former case is considered 
below. 
 
‘Stickiness’ in decision-making and economic behaviour can have a positive social 
economic value in such cases. This is because the loss in consumers’ plus producers’ 
surplus is less than it would have been had market decision-making been more 
volatile, and economic behaviour more reactive. 
 
This hypothesis is readily illustrated by considering the simplest type of market 
cobweb model. In this model, sellers base their supply decisions on the assumption 
that the price they receive for their product in one period will prevail in the next. 
This type of behaviour can result in considerable market instability. Depending on 
the relative slopes of the supply and demand curves in these markets, it can generate 
cycles that converge towards market equilibrium, and those which do not. The latter 
cycles may be of an explosive nature (resulting in increasing divergence from 
market equilibrium) or such that regular cycling around the market equilibrium 
occurs without there being divergence or convergence to this equilibrium.  
 
If there is less responsiveness to price changes (compared to the simple cobweb 
case) this reduces the amplitude of the market cycles. Suppose for example, that 
market disruption is caused by a sudden fall in demand for a product. Imagine that 
suppliers react to this lower price by predicting a somewhat higher price in the next 
period or that they act as if they do this. Suppose also that in subsequent periods 
when the market price has risen, they anticipate a somewhat lower price in the next 
period and then, when the market price has risen, they expect a lower price in the 
next or they act as if they do. Consequently, their market reactions are moderated 
compared to the simple cobweb case, and the amplitude of cycling around the new 
market equilibrium is reduced. 
 
This is illustrated in Fig. 2. The market for the focal commodity is assumed to be 
initially in equilibrium at point E1. Now assume that the demand curve for the 
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commodity drops to DD, and that the supply curve shown by AS remains unaltered. 
The new market equilibrium is now E2. As a result of the sudden drop in demand, 
the price of the commodity falls from P1 to P0. This gives rise, if the simple cobweb 
model applies, to the cobweb relationship which is more distant from E2 than an 
easier one also shown.  
 
The inner web results if the responses of suppliers to price changes are moderated 
(as a whole) compared to the situation in which the simple cobweb applies. The 
heavy dots identify (once market demand for the commodity suddenly contracts) 
the successive market values generated by the different types of decisions made by 
suppliers, that is if the simple cobweb relationship applies and if restrained market 
variations occur. Only a portion of the different cycles are illustrated.  
 
It is evident from Fig. 2 that the amplitude of the market fluctuations is reduced if 
the market reactions of suppliers are restrained. Furthermore, the divergence 
between actual market values and equilibrium values is reduced if this type of 
restraint occurs. Consequently, the sum of consumers’ surplus plus producers’ 
surplus is greater than otherwise. In fact, both buyers and sellers benefit by an 
increase in their flow of surpluses as a result of the reduction in the amplitude of 
the market cycles. 
 
The above analysis assumes that the extent of the restraint in decision-making and 
behaviour displayed by suppliers as a whole still results in market cycles being 
generated. It is however, conceivable that the market responses of suppliers may be 
so sticky, as a whole, that market cycling does not occur. The effect of this needs 
additional analysis.  
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Figure 2 
 
Illustration in which convergence to a new market equilibrium is facilitated if 
the overall reactions of suppliers is more restrained than in the 
simple cobweb case. 
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If their responses are very shaky, this can impede movement towards market 
equilibrium. If these responses are too sticky, the outcome can be less beneficial 
from a social point of view than when some cycling occurs. This happens if 
derivations from the market equilibrium are more prolonged and are larger than in 
the case of cycling alternatives. Both socially excessive and inadequate restraint in 
market decision-making are possible when the results of this type of modeling of 
decisions and behaviour are analyzed. 
 
The above modeling assumes that beliefs are conservatively updated after each 
market period. However, in some markets, beliefs may only be intermittently 
updated and when adjustments do occur, they may do so by substantial amounts, 
resulting in over-reactions to changing market conditions (Henckel et al., 2018; 
Menzies and Zizzo, 2009). 
 
There are several reasons why stickiness in decision-making can occur apart from 
caution in adjusting beliefs. For example, satisficing behaviour by normal market 
participants can be present. In these cases, satisficers do not alter their market 
behaviour unless their level of satisfaction drops below some threshold, or unless 
the benefits forgone by not adjusting are quite large. Transaction costs can also play 
a role in reinforcing stickiness in decision-making.  
 
Sitzia et al. (2015) found that in relation to the market for electricity and gas 
services, complexity in the number and bundling of alternative tariffs resulted in 
consumer inattention to market alterations and therefore, in sticky choices by 
consumers as well as sub-optimal outcomes for them. The first mentioned influence 
appears to be a reflection of the existence of bounded rationality (that is, the benefit 
of finding the best tariff exceeding the decision-making cost of doing so). 
Inattention is a somewhat vague notion. However, a low level of attention can also 
be a product of satisficing behaviour. 
 
An important issue that needs more consideration is the extent of differences in 
these types of decisions by buyers and why they occur, as well as the way they are 
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associated with socioeconomic factors. For example, are on average low income 
individuals more conversant with the prices of staple food items than those on 
higher incomes and are they more likely to change the composition of their food 
purchases as these prices alter? If so why? 
 
In some markets (such as stock markets), the balance between the numbers of those 
who make their decisions based on fundamental considerations and chartists can 
also be important in influencing the dynamics and stability of these markets 
(Lasselle et al., 2005). One of the reasons why the prices of crypto currencies are 
so unstable is that they possess no long-term economic fundamentals to help anchor 
their prices. Furthermore, in other markets, the balance between those who decide 
on their market behaviour by pursuing satisficing aims and those who are motivated 
to maximize their anticipated profit influences the dynamics and stability of these 
markets (Lasselle et al., 2001; Tisdell, 2013, Section 9.2). 
 
The diversity in decision-making displayed by market participants has many 
different economic implications. The study of this subject is in its infancy and there 
is still much to be learnt. Nevertheless, progress is being made because it is now 
widely recognized that market decision-making and behaviour is more complex and 
varied than was assumed in neoclassical economic theory. 
6. Concluding Comments 
There is strong evidence of differences in types of decision-making made by 
individuals. Advances in economic thought and its applications will be facilitated 
if this is given greater recognition in the development of economic theory and 
empirical work. This hypothesis, however, is not inconsistent with some types of 
economic decision-making and behaviour being more common than other types. 
Nevertheless, the presence of this diversity is relevant both from pragmatic and 
theoretical points of view, as has been illustrated in this paper. 
 
There are many reasons why the types of decision-making of individuals can be 
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disparate. It is often reasonable for economic agents, depending on their different 
circumstances, to adopt decision processes which are dissimilar but nevertheless 
rational, as has been explained above. In addition, irrational types of decision-
making and behaviour can occur. There may be some regularities in the frequencies 
of these types of behaviour but even when this is not so, the differences are likely 
to have predictable consequences which are amenable to analysis. 
 
Some empirical evidence was presented of the diversity in differences in the 
decision-making behaviour of individuals, for example, about disparities in the 
ways that tourists make their decisions to visit tourist attractions. Business 
implications of these examples were noted. Evidence from an experiment 
conducted by Henckel et al. (2018) also supported the existence of disparities in 
decision-making processes and the limited occurrence of rational beliefs when 
judged by their conformity with Bayes law. 
 
Diversity in the types of market decisions made by market participants can be 
influential in affecting market dynamics. For example, as demonstrated, if the 
mixture of reactions of sellers to changes in market prices is more restrained than 
in the simple cobweb case, this can have socially favorable consequences for the 
nature of market dynamics. Up to a point, both buyers and sellers can gain by 
decisions which result in restrained market responses. Although restrained or 
stickiness in decision-making is not always socially (or individually) desirable, it is 
important to identify circumstances in which this is so and those for which it is not 
the case.  
 
In addition, bearing in mind the prevalence of uncertainties, it is worthwhile 
undertaking further research to determine the circumstances under which cautious 
sticky types of decisions are rational, as well as those where this is not so. 
Consideration also needs to be given to how and why the mixture of different types 
of decision-making by market participants alters. This will benefit from 
experimental evidence and behavioural/psychological studies.  
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